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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with a number of conceptual and theoretical issues that
underlie the proposal to employ narrative explanations in science education: What is narra-
tive?Whatisexplanation?andWhatisnarrativeexplanation?Inansweringthesequestions,
we develop a framework of narrative elements and characteristics of narrative explanations.
Two possible examples of narrative explanation are presented and examined in light of the
framework. This examination brings to light various conceptual and empirical questions
related to the examples and to the larger issue of the use of examples like them in science
instruction. The value of the framework lies partly in its power to point to such questions.
The questions can guide a program of theoretical and empirical research into the psycho-
logical reality of the narrative form of explanation, the existence of narrative explanations
in science, the use of narrative explanations in science teaching, and the nature and extent
of the narrative effect upon which proposals for the use of narrative often are justiﬁed.
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INTRODUCTION
Narrative is a centerpiece of literary studies. For decades narrative also has had a
prominent place in educational studies, both as a focus of research methodology and of
instructional content. Attracted by the educational beneﬁts narratives are presumed to pro-
mote, many scholars have argued for greater use of narratives in science education. For
example, motivated by the assumed power of narrative as a communicative device, Co-
nant (1947) embedded scientiﬁc explanations in the context of historical case studies that
narrated the social milieu and personal lives of scientists. Conant did not treat scientiﬁc
explanations themselves as narratives, but cast the pursuit and development of explanations
within story lines “to assist the student in recapturing the experience of those who once
participated in exciting events in scientiﬁc history” (Nash, 1950, p. 3). Conant’s usage is
similar to one found in Norris (1992), which supported telling a more accurate story of the
practical reasoning involved in science as a way to counteract the widespread stereotyping
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and distortion of science. Solomon (2002) also recommended historical stories about sci-
ence, not only to increase student motivation and enjoyment, but also for several other
important purposes such as the facilitation of ethical discussion. Harr´ e (1986), who sees
science not primarily as a static body of knowledge but rather as a dynamic engagement
of people within a community, drew upon another source of story in science, namely, the
communal practice of science. Myers (1990) saw narratives of scientiﬁc discoveries in the
interpretations of ﬁndings originally reported in journal articles: The articles themselves
are reports of logical sequences of experiments, compared to subsequent interpretations of
the research that tend to be more narrative in their form. Smolin (1997) aimed to capitalize
upon a presumed motivational advantage in the use of the narrative form: “nonscientists,
who—not sharing the conventions of formal scientiﬁc monologue—can relate more eas-
ily to a personal story than to a ritualized display of impersonality” (pp. 6, 7). Meyer
(2000) seems similarly motivated in attempting to address “the estrangement of females
from science” (p. 78) by encouraging greater participation with natural phenomena and
by exposing students to the ﬁrst level of scientiﬁc description through story telling (cf.,
Brickhouse, Lowery, & Schultz, 2000). As a ﬁnal example, in Beyond 2000, Millar and
Osborne (1998) propose that science education “make greater use of one of the world’s
most powerful and pervasive ways of communicating ideas—the narrative form” (p. 2013).
They argue that such narratives in science can prove useful in “communicating ideas, and
in making ideas coherent, memorable, and meaningful” (p. 2013). Narratives, they claim,
emphasize interrelated sets of ideas. In contrast, science education too often focuses on
ideas in isolation, and consequently obscures the major themes at the core of the science.
Our focus is on the explanatory role of narratives. This concern is narrower than many of
those above. Our aim is to help science educators study and test the wide array of proposals
for using narrative explanations in science education by providing a comprehensive frame-
work for distinguishing such explanations from others. Barring the ability to make such
distinctions, it is impossible to conduct research that examines the assumptions, claims,
and conjectures that have been made about narrative explanations.
Although we acknowledge that many empirical issues require resolution before a com-
prehensive understanding of narrative explanation is possible, it is the theoretical that shall
be our primary concern for this paper. We examine a number of conceptual and theoretical
issues that remain unresolved, and usually unexamined, in all the thinking on the use of
narrative explanation in science education. Our interest derives from several sources. First,
we believe there may be merit to using narrative explanation in science education that can
be articulated more completely once a conceptual foundation is more fully established.
Second, the value of all of these proposals rests on the existence of a narrative effect that
enhances memory, interest, and understanding. We shall speak to this effect and raise sev-
eral important questions related to it. The theoretical framework outlined in this paper will
assist in evaluating critically research designed to determine the substance and extent of
that effect. Third, as implied above, the science education community needs a theory of
narrative explanations to identify where they exist in science, to do research on them, and
to create them for curricular purposes if this seems warranted.
We shall proceed as follows. First, we shall provide answers to the three questions
already posed: What is narrative? What is explanation? and What is narrative explanation?
Any theory of narrative explanation must provide answers to these questions in order to be
abletoassessthenarrativecredentialsofallegedexamplesaswellastojudgethevalidityof
any proposal to use narrative explanation in science teaching and to test its usefulness. We
shall offer as the core of our framework a set of eight narrative elements that we propose
as deﬁning features of narratives and a set of distinguishing characteristics of narrative
explanations. We hope that the framework will prove useful to research on identifying andNARRATIVE EXPLANATION IN SCIENCE 537
possibly creating narrative explanations in science and studying their effects. Second, we
shall speak brieﬂy to the empirical research on the narrative effect and use our theoretical
framework to suggest other research that is needed. Third, using the theoretical framework,
weshallexaminetwocandidatesfornarrativeexplanation,onefromtheMillarandOsborne
document and one from a science trade book. We shall show that the framework would
suggest very different interpretations of the narrative credentials of these examples. This
contrast enables us to frame a number of empirical questions that must be addressed before
the value of such examples for science instruction can be established. Finally, we draw
some implications for science education should a proposal to introduce more narrative
explanations into the curriculum be taken seriously.
Inordertounderstandpreciselywhereourinterestlies,itiscriticaltodistinguishbetween
explanationsintrinsictothedisciplineofscienceandthosethatareextrinsic.Anexplanation
intrinsic to science is one that explains some natural phenomenon and is part of the body of
scientiﬁc knowledge. The theory of universal gravitation, plate tectonic theory, and evolu-
tionary theory provide explanations intrinsic to science. An explanation extrinsic to science
isonethatexplainssomethingaboutscience,andisthusoutsidethebodyofscientiﬁcknowl-
edge itself. Examples of extrinsic explanations include those of how the discovery of the
neutrinowasmade,ofhowscientiﬁcknowledgemovedawayfromvitalismovertime,andof
themotivationsandtrialsofGalileosurroundingthepublicationofhisDialogue.Conant,to
giveoneexample,providedsuchextrinsicexplanationsinhiscasehistories.Ourdiscussion
of narrative explanation will apply to both of these categories of explanations, and thus can
be of guidance to science educators dealing with either type. However, we shall focus our
attention on intrinsic explanations, because there is a signiﬁcant question surrounding the
existence of intrinsic explanations in narrative form. There are many examples of extrinsic
narrativeexplanations,sothereisnodisputeovertheirexistence.Thedisputewithextrinsic
narrative explanations, where it exists at all, is over their effects on science learning. If
the question of the existence of narrative explanations intrinsic to science could be settled,
then this would mark an important theoretical advance. The development of a theoretical
framework for recognizing such explanations is the crucial ﬁrst step needed at this time.
Anotherissuethatneedstobeaddressedistheimportanceofdevelopingaframeworkfor
narrative explanations. Clearly, a theory of narrative is not needed to create ﬁne narratives,
because we possessed an enormous body of them before narratology existed. Also, because
there are indisputed cases of narrative, much important research on narrative can be done
without an articulated theory of narrative characteristics. However, perhaps more so in
science than in other ﬁelds, it is unlikely that the alleged narrative explanations we ﬁnd
are going to fall into the category of clear-cut cases. If they are not clear cut, then we will
require a means of making deliberate decisions about their status. Only then, will we be
able to interpret the results of any studies using them and be in a position to adjudicate the
merit of narrative inclusion in science.
WHAT IS NARRATIVE?
Not surprisingly, a very common source of discussions of narrative, including attempts
todeﬁnethisformofdiscourse,istheliteraturerelatedtotheanalysisofworksofﬁction.In
addition,narrativehasbeenexaminedbyphilosophersofhistoryinordertoexplorewhether
history relies on narrative to explain the past. We also strove to locate and emphasize works
that refer to narrative in science. Using these vast bodies of work, we have attempted to
forge an accurate and comprehensive theoretical position that takes into account as much
as possible the points of consensus, of which there are several. In so doing, we have not
incorporated the ﬁndings of other bodies of work that treat the questions from an empirical538 NORRIS ET AL.
perspective,dealingwithsuchissuesaswhattextsordinaryreadersjudgetobenarrativeand
what features are used by the readers to distinguish narrative from nonnarrative. We cannot
assume that answers to what is narrative from the theoretical domain will map directly or
even easily onto answers from the empirical domain. We understand, however, that both
perspectives will be needed for a comprehensive understanding of narrative.
Within the theoretical perspective, one statement in particular has been repeatedly ref-
erenced in literary discussions on narrative, and can serve to frame our discussion: “We
might conceive of narrative discourse most minimally and most generally as verbal acts
consisting of someone telling someone that something happened” (Herrnstein Smith, 1981,
p. 228). In this statement are found references to a narrator (someone telling), a narratee
(someone receiving, whom, because we are concerned primarily with written stories, we
shall call the “reader”), events (something that happened), and past time. We shall consider
each of these narrative elements, and also describe important narrative features highlighted
by other theorists: narrative appetite, structure, agency, and purpose.
Something Happened (Event-Tokens)
There is widespread agreement that narrative requires, at its most basic, an account of a
sequence of events (Berger, 1997; Cobley, 2001; Cohen & Shires, 1988; Tambling, 1991;
van Peer & Chatman, 2001). However, a simple recitation of a series of events does not
constitute narrative. A list of events, ordered in chronological sequence, is referred to as an
annal (White, 1981). Here is an example:
411 BC Aristophanes wrote Lysistrata
1066 William I, the Conqueror, was crowned King of England
1854 Oscar Wilde was born
1927 Babe Ruth hit 60 home runs
1932 Vitamin D was discovered
1949 Newfoundland and Labrador became the 10th Canadian province
If a list of events is about a uniﬁed subject, “we arrive at a somewhat more complex
structure than the annal which has been called the ‘chronicle”’ (Carroll, 2001, p. 25). Here
is an example:
ca. 500 BC Leucippus advanced a theory of atomism
1704 Newton proposed a mechanical universe with small solid masses in motion
1803 Dalton proposed a “modern atomic theory”
1897 Thomson announced his discovery of electrons
1911 Rutherford ﬁrst proposed the nucleus concept
1913 Bohr published “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules”
1930 Schr¨ odinger introduced wave mechanics
Danto (1985), a philosopher of history, noted that chroniclers who write at roughly the
same time as the events they are describing, “pretend to no knowledge not really available
to contemporaries of the events designated” (p. 354). Thus, chroniclers recording events
as they happen cannot know the signiﬁcance of what they are recounting, because they are
unabletoconsideritinthelightofwhatfollows.Myers’(1990)observationthattheprocess
ofscientiﬁcdiscovery“cannotbelocatedinthepaperstowhichitisusuallytraced”(p.104)
is similar in its point. That is, authors of scientiﬁc papers are often chroniclers, outlining,
particularly in the methods and results sections, what they did (e.g., we adapted...,w e
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found...). In addition, in interpreting their data, scientists are able to make comparisons
only to work done previously to theirs. And, although they may surmise that their work has
signiﬁcance, it is not possible to assign it pivotal or seminal status at the time of writing.
However,articlesinjournalslikeNatureandSciencecanintegratethe“discoveryeventinto
larger narratives” (Myers, 1990, p. 104), accounts where the signiﬁcance of the discovery
can be made much more obvious. The same is true of narrators who know the future course
that events will take (it is, after all, their story), and who can use this knowledge to attribute
signiﬁcance to the events they are recounting or to insinuate signiﬁcance into them in order
to keep readers in suspense.
In addition to a sequence of events about a uniﬁed subject, a narrative requires that
the events be connected so that individual events can be seen in the perspective of the
others. Richardson (1990), commenting on Bruner’s (1986) differentiation between logico-
scientiﬁc and narrative modes of thinking, explains that while the logico-scientiﬁc mode
“looks for universal truth conditions...the narrative mode looks for particular connections
between events” (p. 118). Although narrative does not require that an earlier event causally
necessitatealaterevent,Carroll(2001)observesthattheearliereventinanarrativeconnec-
tion must be “at least a necessary or indispensable contribution...for the occurrence of the
relevant later event in the narrative complex” (p. 28). Martin (1986) notes that in narrative,
“The earliest events recounted take on their meaning and act as causes only because of the
later ones. Whereas most sciences involve prediction, narrative involves ‘retrodiction.’ It is
the end of the temporal series—how things eventually turned out—that determines which
event began it: we know it was a beginning because of the end” (p. 74). Thus, meaning in
history, ﬁction, and biography (and, if narrative is intrinsic to it, sometimes in science) is
developed by going back in time from a known effect to ﬁnd its causes (Cleland, 2002).
Polkinghorne (1988) comments that narrative is “a meaning structure that organizes events
and human actions into a whole, thereby attributing signiﬁcance to individual actions and
events according to their effect on the whole” (p. 18).
Forexample,Dickens’sHardTimesopenswithMr.Gradgrind’sspeechontheimportance
of facts, namely that nothing but facts are ever of any service to reasoning animals. In the
subsequent chapters, readers are introduced to students in Mr. Gradgrind’s class, to the
“little pitchers...ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them until they were
full to the brim” (1996, pp. 41–42). Although this approach to life has an effect on all the
children exposed to it, the effect varies depending on the unique combination of events
experienced by each character. While both Thomas and Louisa, two of Mr. Gradgrind’s
“model” students, had “been lectured at from their tenderest years” (p. 48) to ensure their
allegiance to facts and the elimination of any inclination toward Fancy, their individual
personalities and reactions to events render them very different people by the end of the
book. Because Thomas and Louisa initially are portrayed as similar children, in order to
understand why and how they became so different, readers need to look back at earlier
events once the fact of their dissimilarity becomes apparent.
This is consistent with Martin’s (1986) assertion, because the earlier events in Dickens’
narrative do not allow the reader to predict what will ultimately happen. However, as the
story unfolds, as the number of associated events increases, readers can begin to perceive
and understand the interconnection among those events and grasp how what is happening
to characters is a result of what came before. Narrative, thus, is formed through contingen-
cies as well as causally necessitating events. That is, narrative accounts interconnect both
events of nearly certain consequences and events that, when ﬁrst encountered, have highly
unpredictableoutcomes.Thelatter,thecontingentevents,arethosethatgainmeaningretro-
dictively. And, although contingent events are a key element in understanding narrative, we
will defer an elaboration of this topic until our discussion of narrative explanation.540 NORRIS ET AL.
The idea of events leading to changes of state is also central to narrative: “An event,
bringing a change of state, is the most fundamental requirement in narrative” (Toolan,
1988, p. 90). Here we return to the concept of narrative being an account of a sequence
of events, but with an added emphasis on events that “delineate a process of change, the
transformation of one event into another” (Cohen & Shires, 1988, p. 53). Miller, too, listed
change as a basic element of narrative: “There must be, ﬁrst of all, an initial situation, a
sequence leading to a change or reversal of that situation, and a revelation made possible by
thereversalofsituation”(1995,p.75).Additionally,Lodge(1986)remindsusthatalthough
narrative is concerned with “change in a given state of affairs....I tmust have a point, and
it must have some kind of unity” (p. 142).
Someone Telling (Narrator)
For Scholes and Kellogg (1966), a narrative requires no more and no less than a teller
and a tale. Similarly, Bal (1985), in her somewhat circular deﬁnition of narrative, states, “A
narrativetextisatextinwhichanagentrelatesanarrative”(p.5).Toolan(1988),indescrib-
ing the narrator as the necessary source of narrative, adds that this holds true “no matter
how backgrounded or remote or ‘invisible”’ (p. 5) that narrator remains. No narrator—no
story, because it is the narrator who takes what is simply a sequence of events before the
telling and fashions it into a whole having meaning. To do this, narrators must determine
the point (Lodge, 1986) and the purpose of the story to be told. Subsequent to this, narra-
tors must choose events they perceive as developing that predetermined point and purpose.
Further, to create suspense and anticipation, narrators deliberately choose the sequence in
which events will be told (Genette, 1980). All of this construction involves interpretation:
in the narrator’s recollection or imagination of what happened, selection from among those
recollections, and recitation choices for their particular audiences (Hawthorn, 1985).
Unsurprisingly,narratologists(e.g.,Bal,1985;O’Neill,1994;Tambling,1991)arguethat
the way a narrator tells a story strongly affects the narrative quality of that story. That is, the
narrator’schoiceofwhattotellandhowtotellitaffectsthedegreetowhichtheothersome-
one(thereaderorlistener)becomesengagedwiththestory.Nearlyeveryonehasexperienced
how a good storyteller can take a set of seemingly humdrum events and weave them into an
engrossing narrative. Contrariwise, we have seen that even a good story in the hands of a
less-skilled narrator can appear humdrum. The contrast is evident in the following two pas-
sagesintroducingIsaacNewtontothereader.Bothcontainaccuratelistingsofeventsrelated
to Newton’s life. The second, however, opens up issues and questions in a way the ﬁrst does
not.Thedifferenceisinthetelling,because,presumably,bothauthorshadaccesstomostof
the same facts. The difference is also in the authors’ purposes. The ﬁrst author was writing
a manual, a sourcebook on experimental physics. The second was writing a biography.
1. Isaac Newton was born in Woolsthorpe, Lincolnshire, on December 25, 1642. He
wasaposthumous child. His father, also named Isaac, was the owner of the little
manor of Woolsthorpe. When Newton reached his majority, he inherited this estate,
and remained in possession of the manorial rights until his death. (Magie, 1963,
p. 30)
2. Isaac Newton said he had seen farther by standing on the shoulders of giants, but he
did not believe it. He was born into a world of darkness, obscurity, and magic; led
a strangely pure and obsessive life, lacking parents, lovers, and friends; quarreled
bitterly with great men who crossed his path; veered at least once to the brink of
madness; cloaked his work in secrecy; and yet discovered more of the essential core
of human knowledge than anyone before or after. (Gleick, 2003, p. 3)NARRATIVE EXPLANATION IN SCIENCE 541
Narrative Appetite (Wanting to Know What Happened)
Inorderforanarrativediscoursetoﬂourish,bothparties(thenarratorandthereader)have
to ﬁnd engagement in this social transaction interesting enough to prevail over competing
activities. Thus, stories must not only be accounts of events, but accounts of events that
someone cares to know more about; we must want to know what happened if we are to
continue reading or listening. Lodge (1986) refers to this desire to learn more about what
happened as “narrative appetite.”
AsCobley(2001)writes,“narrativehasthepotentialtobethoroughlycaptivating”(pp.9–
10). Similarly, Miller (1981) refers to the “latent potentialities” to be found in narrative,
potentialities that incite narrative appetite through “instances of disequilibrium, suspense,
and general insufﬁciency” (p. ix). Martin (1986) declares that readers are led to want to
know what happens next through the tensions and reversals of situations found in narrative.
Prince (1995) stresses that narrative text is characterized by actions that have “logically
unpredictable antecedents or consequences” (p. 80) and that these foster an appetite for
more. Further, MacIntyre (1981) emphasizes that it is crucial that at any given point in a
narrative the reader or listener not know what will happen next. It is this not knowing, but
having a sense of a range of possibilities that Carroll (2001) claims creates the anticipation
that is necessary for narrative comprehension. This anticipation, based on expectations of
possible actions or events happening, is constrained by earlier events in the story. That
is, only certain anticipations are created. The expectations created are, in turn, based on
knowledge of the world, of the conventions of the narrative genre, and of the thought and
actions probable in the culture in which the narrative is situated. All of these—suspense,
reversals, unpredictability within cultural bounds—are means for sustaining interest in the
story, that is, for maintaining narrative appetite. After reading only the ﬁrst nine lines of
Gleick’s biography of Newton, we want to know in what ways Newton was strangely pure
and obsessive, with which great men he bitterly quarreled, what drove him to madness and
to a desire for secrecy, and, if he was so secretive, why we know of his work and what we
mightnotknowofit.Thestageissetformuchthatistofollow.Thereaderishookedwiththe
contradictions between the image of Newton as a great scientist and “chief architect of the
modern world” and someone from whom, because of his personality, we might withdraw.
Time (The Past)
The expectation that narrative not only tell a story, but “do so interestingly” (O’Neill,
1994, p. 4), compels narrators to select ways to tell stories that will entice their audiences
to want to know what happens. One means at their disposal is the manipulation of time.
Time is considered a central deﬁning element of narrative. In Scholes’s (1981) view, only
a “time-thing” can be narrated, events “connected by subject matter and related by time”
(p. 205). Ricoeur (1984), author of a three-volume book entitled Time and Narrative, adds
a human dimension to this time discussion by claiming that narrative portrays the tempo-
ral character of human experience. Tambling (1991), explaining Ricouer’s phrase, “time
becomes human,” suggests that narrative gives substance to events that might otherwise
remain abstract, thereby allowing readers to understand what has happened and, further, to
use this understanding as a way of conceptualizing and acting in the present. Magie and
Gleickmadequitedifferentdecisionsabouthowtomanipulatetimeintheirprose.Whereas
Magie began at the beginning of Newton’s life, telling us ﬁrst his place and date of birth,
Gleick told us ﬁrst of an event that took place well into Newton’s adult life. These different
choices make a difference to how readers are engaged by the text.
Not only is time considered fundamental to narrative, but the consensus view is that
“narratives concern the past” (Martin, 1986, p. 74). In Herrnstein Smith’s (1981) deﬁnition,542 NORRIS ET AL.
withwhichwestartedthisdiscussion,narrativeis“someonetellingsomeonethatsomething
happened[italicsadded]”(p.228).Thatis,narrativeevents,eitheractuallyorimaginatively,
occur prior to their telling. Moffett (1983) also emphasized that narrative discourse is
concerned with what happened. He adds, “The essence of story is once upon a time. Once.
Unique and unrepeatable events—not ‘recurring’ events, as in science” (p. 121). Moffett’s
observation about the nature of science will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
Structure
Narrative, we have shown, is a narrator’s recounting of “events structured in time” (van
Peer & Chatman, 2001). The elements of both time and structure are associated in many
descriptions of narrative. Chatman (1981) writes that a salient feature of narrative is its
“doubletimestructuring”(p.118).Heexplainsthatnarrativescombinethetimesequenceof
ploteventswith“discourse-time,”thesequenceinwhichthenarratorordersthestory.“What
isfundamentaltonarrative,”Chatmanwrites,“isthatthesetwotimeordersareindependent”
(p. 118). Narrators are able to manipulate order and duration of events and make use of
techniques like ﬂashbacks, ﬂash forwards, and foreshadowing to achieve a desired effect
(Genette, 1980). Chatman contrasts this treatment of time with that in nonnarrative texts
where “discourse-time is irrelevant” (p. 118) and logical or chronological ordering takes
precedence.
Many analyses of narrative are variations on the traditional beginning-middle-end struc-
tureofstories(e.g.,Gudmundsdottir,1995;Roth,1989;Scholes,1981).Bal(1985)proposes
that three phases are to be distinguished in every story: the possibility, the event, and the
result or conclusion. Miller (1995) describes narratives as comprising an initial situation,
followed by a sequence leading to a change or reversal of that situation, and ending with
ar evelation made possible by the reversal of situation. Similarly, van Peer and Chatman
(2001) write that narratives “typically start with imbalances that protagonists attempt to
redress. Usually these attempts lead to complications, setbacks, crises, and ultimately to
success or failure” (p. 2). Thus, Gleick in his ﬁrst nine lines refers to imbalances that would
confront Newton throughout his life. Egan (1986) refers to the rhythm found in narrative,
explaining that stories “set up an expectation at the beginning, this is elaborated or com-
plicated in the middle, and is satisﬁed in the end. Stories are tied beginning to end by
their satisfying the expectation set up in the beginning” (p. 24). All of these descriptions
recognize the signiﬁcance of structure in the creation and comprehension of narrative.
Iser (1980) was interested in the element of “connectability” that structures different
texts. Connectability, he maintained, must be “strictly observed in expository texts where
an argument is to be developed or information is to be conveyed” (p. 183). In such texts,
the writer aims for a precise interpretation where a “multiplicity of possible meanings must
be constantly narrowed down” (p. 185). In contrast, such strict connectability is replaced
in ﬁctional narrative by “blanks,” by vacancies and shifts that release possibilities and
mobilize readers’ imaginations, thereby maintaining interest as well as opening the text to
the possibility of multiple interpretations.
Agency
Although not all narrative analysts insist that agents or characters (human or otherwise)
are an essential feature of narrative, for many, narrative “at its simplest...displays a group
of characters who live in a given place as time passes” (Ireland, 200l, p. 26). Statements by
Bal(1985)andCohenandShires(1988)exemplifycommonviewsexpressedabouttherole
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“require some agency of action: characters” (p. 69). Bal explains that a story is “a series
of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors”
(p. 5) and that these actors need not be human. Actors and agents normally introduce an
ethical element into narrative, because they must take responsibility for the effects of their
actions. Abbott (2002) advocates substituting “entity” for “character.” Although admitting
that “entity” may seem cold and abstract, he argues that because a narrative may concern
“the story of an atom, say, or an experiment involving the interaction of chemical elements,
or the history of shifting landmasses, or the evolution of planetary systems, it would seem
strained to continue to speak of characters” (p. 17). Thus, Abbott does not demand agency
for there to be narrative.
McEwan and Egan (1995) stress that narrative is valuable in that it forms “a framework
within which our discourse about human thought and possibility evolve.... [functioning]
to make our actions intelligible to ourselves as well as to others” (p. xiii). Here, again, there
is a focus on the human features of narrative. In his examination of narrative, Bruner has
consistentlydepictedthisgenreasdealing“withthevicissitudesofhumanintentions”(1986,
p. 16) and being composed of “happenings involving human beings as characters or actors”
(1990, p. 43). Polkinghorne (1988) states that narratives work “to draw together human
actions and the events that affect human beings and not relationships among inanimate
objects” (p. 6). In addition, Mattingly (1991) differentiated narrative from nonnarrative
accounts on the basis of the focus on people: “Narrative descriptions highlighted the role
that particular actors play in shaping the project component. In the non-narrative account
no actors were identiﬁed” (p. 242).
Purpose
Although it has been alleged that the main purpose of narrative is to entertain (Weaver
& Kintsch, 1991), this is a narrower description than that ascribed to this genre by many
philosophers of narrative. For example, Coles (1989) writes that stories are constructed to
helpusunderstandtheworldwelivein:tohelp“comprehendthelifethatisinmeandaround
me” (p. 189). Tilley (1992), taking what might be considered a constructivist stand, argues
that it is through narrative that we are able to “accommodate the new within that which is
familiar to us” (p. 150). In these descriptions of purpose, narrative can be interpreted as
helping us better understand the natural as well as the human world.
Similarly to those emphasizing the human-centeredness of narrative, numerous writers
tie narrative purpose closely to advancing an understanding of human actions and feelings.
This can be seen in Witherall’s (1995) statement that “stories enable us to imagine and feel
theexperienceofothers”(p.41)andMacIntyre’sobservationthatstorieshelpusunderstand
“how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed” (1981,
p. 201).
Phelen (1996), who views narrative as having a strong rhetorical dimension, emphasizes
that narrative has “the purpose of communicating knowledge, feelings, values and beliefs”
(p. 18). This is a broad deﬁnition, indeed, as it encompasses both knowledge and emotions
and the intention to persuade or inﬂuence others.
Someone Receiving (Reader)
We nowcometothesecondsomeoneinHerrnsteinSmith’s(1981)deﬁnitionofnarrative,
therecipientofthestory.Justasthetellingofastoryisaninterpretiveactforthenarrator,the
reception of that story requires interpretation by its reader. Emphasizing this role, Cobley
(2001) calls the reader of a story the interpreting agent. Martin (1986) writes that the reader544 NORRIS ET AL.
producesmeaning;meaningisnotfoundmerelybydecodingtext.Instead,areaderemploys
a number of different processes and activities, such as inferring, construing, projecting,
hypothesizing, imagining, and anticipating (Herrnstein Smith, 1981), to make meaning.
Because reading for meaning requires effort, a reader must be sufﬁciently interested in
what is happening and in what might happen next to continue to engage in the reading act.
Knowledge of genre, form and rhythms, and reading processes constructed during previous
reading experiences help readers navigate new text (Bakhtin/Medvedev, 1991; Cohen &
Shires, 1988). Because readers draw on genre knowledge when reading, Toolan remarks
that“narrativedependsontheaddresseeseeingitasnarrative”(1988,p.7).Genreknowledge
helps readers anticipate and interpret text and helps shape their perspective on events and
their focus on what is likely to be signiﬁcant and salient in a particular text (Toolan, 1988).
It will, in addition, suggest whether they should approach the text analytically, affectively,
or both (Rosenblatt, 1991). It is, thus, through active engagement with text that a reader
constructs meaning (Norris & Phillips, 1994). If the reader recognizes a text as narrative, it
will be read through a “narrative lens,” with the clarity of that lens sharpened by knowledge
and attitudes formed from previous exposure to stories. If a reader judges a text to be telling
a story, he or she will approach it with a set of anticipations and expectations distinct from
those that would be held if the text were judged to be expository or argumentative.
Section Summary and Discussion
Table1containsaconciseoverviewofthekeypointsmadeinthissection.Thereareeight
narrativeelementsidentiﬁed.Wedonottaketheseelementstomakeupasetofnecessaryand
sufﬁcientconditionsfornarratives.Rather,wewouldsaythatapieceofproseisnarrativeto
theextentthatitfeaturestheseelements.Thatis,therearedegreesofnarrativity.Thequestion
remains whether some elements are more important than others. We speculate that there is
a hierarchy of importance. The narrator, narrative appetite, structure, purpose, and reader
seem to be of secondary importance in determining degree of narrativity. Although these
elements are important, we can imagine narratives in which these elements are represented
poorly or not at all. For example, lack of narrative appetite does not mean there is no story.
It perhaps signals a story poorly told, but there can be a story nevertheless. Of primary
importance, we believe, are the existence of event-tokens, past time, and agency: particular
occurrences involving particular actors in the past and over time. Having said this, we are
very interested in examining any examples of prose such as Abbott (2002) imagines that
contain entities incapable of willed behavior in place of agents. For example, he imagines
the story of a planet being struck out of its orbit by an immense asteroid. Because the planet
and the asteroid are insentient objects incapable of willed action, it is not proper to speak
of them as agents. It is crucial to our enterprise here, however, to know whether genuine
stories can be created with such entities taking the place of agents. Abbott also imagines
the story of an atom, and Primo Levi’s memoir (1984, pp. 224–233) contains one of the
better known attempts at such a story. Levi relates what happened to a ﬁctional carbon
atom from the time of its release from limestone (perhaps from the Dolomite Mountains in
northern Italy) in 1940: its eight-year airborne trip as part of a molecule of carbon dioxide,
its capture by the leaf of a grape vine, its entry into wine and its becoming part of a sugar
molecule, its being ingested by a human being, and ﬁnally its being respired attached to
two new atoms of oxygen. Levi’s account has some of the elements of narratives. It names
events, has a narrator, and whets the reader’s curiosity about what will happen next in the
movement of the carbon atom. Of course, the atom is not alive, and hence has no motives,
feelings, or life prospects. We ﬁnd that this lack of agency dulls the sense of narrative
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TABLE 1 Narrative Elements and Their Meanings
Narrative Element Meaning
Event-tokens • particular occurrences involving particular actors at a particular
place and time (event-tokens, see footnote 1 in the What Is
Narrative Explanation? section)
• are chronologically related
• involve a uniﬁed subject and are interconnected
• later events seen as signiﬁcant in light of earlier events
• lead to changes of state
Narrator • the agent relating a narrative (foregrounded or backgrounded)
• determines the point and purpose of the story to be told
• selects events and the sequence in which they are told
• fashions a sequences of events into a signiﬁcant whole
Narrative appetite • desire created in readers and listeners to know what will happen
• based on a range of possibilities that creates anticipation
and suspense
Past time • narratives concern the past
• narrators can manipulate time in relating narratives
Structure • narratives typically start with imbalances, introduce complications,
and end in success or failure
• narratives are structured around two independent time
sequences—the sequence of plot events and the sequence in
which the events are related
• narratives are tied together by satisfying expectations that are
established previously
Agency • actors cause and experience events in narratives
• actors are responsible for their actions
• narratives involve human beings or other moral agents
Purpose • to help us better understand the natural world and humans’
place in it
• to help us imagine and feel the experience of others
Reader • the reader must interpret the text as a narrative in order
to approach it with appropriate expectations and anticipations
No scientiﬁc explanation is carried by Levi’s account, although a number of scientiﬁc
processesarereferenced.Nevertheless,Levi’seffortrepresentsonethatisworthconsidering
and studying in any attempt to write narrative explanations, because its borderline nature
raises an interesting question: Would texts such as Levi’s show a signiﬁcant narrative effect
on memory, interest, and comprehension, or must the texts display more narrative elements
to have this effect? We know of no empirical research that addresses such a question.
However, such research is crucial to evaluating proposals to use narrative explanations in
science, because it is likely that many of the texts created for such a purpose would be
hybrids, either because they contained mixtures of purely narrative and purely nonnarrative
text or because they contained text that does not fall clearly into any category.
WHAT IS EXPLANATION?
No doubt, the fundamental nature of the concept of explanation is part of the reason it
has proved so difﬁcult to explicate in terms of ideas we grasp better. This difﬁculty has
not prevented people from trying, but it is fair to say that we still do not possess a fully
satisfactoryaccountofexplanation.Althoughmanyideashaveprovidedsomeinsight,even546 NORRIS ET AL.
thebestarebesetbyknownﬂaws.Muchofthedifﬁcultyisknowingwheretostart,aproblem
we face here. A number of theorists have thought that explanation is, at its most basic, an
act intended to make something clear, understandable, or intelligible (Brewer, Chinn, &
Samarapungavan, 2000; Danto, 1985; Kim, 1995). Almost anything can be the object of an
explanation so conceived: a word, a poem, a facial expression, an act of violence, a streak
of light in the sky. Passmore (1965), in his examination of explanation in everyday life,
in science, and in history, concluded that although explanations are called for and offered
under a wide variety of circumstances, in each instance an explanation sets out to resolve
a puzzlement. And because we are puzzled by many different things, explanations serve
a number of different functions, most often assigning, developing, or expanding meaning;
offering a justiﬁcation; providing a description; or giving a causal account. These functions
of explanation provide a way into this difﬁcult topic.
First,explanationsofferedtoquestionssuchas“Whatisexaptation?”or“WhatisPopper’s
thesis in The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery?” attempt to clarify and make understandable
by interpreting a term, proposition, or treatise. That is, the explanation assigns, develops
or expands meaning. A second type of puzzlement is addressed by explanations that offer
a justiﬁcation. For example, if asked why we set up an experiment with a plastic tubing
instead of a glass column, we might reply that the tubing was the cheaper, the more readily
availableatthetime,andadequatetothetask.Or,ifaskedwhywedonotsupportthefunding
of a research proposal, we might argue that the objectives are vague and the methodology
is inappropriate. In explanations used to justify, there must be appeal as above to norms,
standards, or values. A third type of puzzlement may be resolved with a descriptive expla-
nation. Kepler’s two laws of planetary motion are of this type, in that they describe what
was happening in contrast to why it was happening (Simon, 2000). They describe the shape
oftheplanetaryrevolutionsandhowtheplanets’motionsaroundthesunarerelatedtotime.
The fourth type of explanation offers a causal account—exempliﬁed by Newton’s expla-
nation of why the planets revolve around the sun. In his explanation, Newton introduced a
mechanism—gravitational force—that caused, not just described, the revolution of planets.
In addition to function, explanations have been distinguished by their type, which com-
plicates matters because function and type overlap in various ways. A type of explanation
that has been examined and debated extensively is the one that most concerns us here,
namely, scientiﬁc explanation. Salmon (1989) afﬁxed a 23-page bibliography to a review
of the major works written on scientiﬁc explanation between 1942 and 1989. The debate
and discussion have continued. For much of the 20th century, the debate centered on the
structure of scientiﬁc explanations as signaled by Nagel’s inﬂuential book of 1961. In that
work, Nagel differentiated four different patterns of scientiﬁc explanation: deductive, prob-
abilistic, functional, and genetic. Although each of these has been the subject of lengthy
analysis and debate, we shall restrict ourselves to a brief description of each in order to
suggest the dimensions of what is perceived to be essential in a scientiﬁc explanation.
The ﬁrst of these, the deductive model, is also referred to as the deductive-nomological
model (D-N) or the covering law model. Although deductive arguments have been ana-
lyzed since antiquity, contemporary deliberation on this type of scientiﬁc explanation is
widely referenced to a 1948 seminal paper by Hempel and Oppenheim (e.g., McErlean,
2000; Salmon, 1989; Sintonen, 1984). Indeed, Salmon (1989) refers to this work as “The
Fountainhead,” and in the same volume Kitcher (1989, p. 410) refers to it as “the pioneer-
ing article” and says that “the main contemporary approaches to explanation attempt to
incorporate what they see as Hempelian insights.” According to Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948, p. 136), “The question ‘Why does the phenomenon happen?’ is construed as mean-
ing ‘according to what general laws, and by virtue of what antecedent conditions does the
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be logically deducible from the antecedent conditions and the general laws. This type of
explanationtheylabeledcausalandtheexplanationsthemselvesweredeductivearguments.
That is, for Hempel and Oppenheim, causal explanations for particular facts are provided
when empirical regularities (general laws) connect a particular set of antecedent conditions
with the occurrence of the particular event. In this respect, their model can be traced to
Hume’s notion of causation as constant conjunction (Hume, 1748/1955), a lineage they
recognize in speaking about cause “in the sense that there are certain empirical regulari-
ties...whichimplythatwheneverconditionsofthekindindicated...occur,aneventofthe
kind described...will take place” (1948, p. 139). As an example of explanation according
to this model, consider the question, “Why did the cannonball travel 2000 ft before hitting
the earth?” The explanation appeals to general laws: (a) The vertical distance traveled by
a freely falling body close to the earth and starting from rest is given by sv = 1
2gt2; (b)
The horizontal distance traveled by an object moving with constant velocity is given by
sh = vt; (c) The horizontal velocity of an object is independent of its vertical velocity. It
also appeals to antecedent conditions, such as: (d) The cannon was aimed horizontally at
a position 64 ft above the earth; (e) The muzzle velocity of the cannonball was 1000 ft/s;
and (f) g = 32 ft/s2.Y ou can see that the distance of 2000 ft is deducible from these six
premises, and because of that we know why the cannonball traveled that distance.
Rescher (1962) argued that if scientiﬁc explanation was conﬁned to deductive argument
from general laws, many modern scientiﬁc discussions would be deﬁned as “outside the
paleofexplanationsproper”(p.50).Rescherandothers(e.g.,Reichenbach,1971;Salmon,
1971), and after 1948 even Hempel (1966), stressed that the concept of scientiﬁc expla-
nation needed to be extended to include explanations based on statistical probability. As
McErlan (2000) states, “while deductive arguments have universal laws which necessitate
their conclusions, the conclusion of an inductive argument is not guaranteed, it is at best
rendered highly probable” (p. 20). According to Salmon (1989), the most important devel-
opment in the second of his Four Decades of Scientiﬁc Explanation was the explicit study
and advancement of models of statistical explanation. In statistical explanation, an event is
explained by showing that its occurrence is highly probable on the basis of given facts and
known statistically general laws.
There have been other, more signiﬁcant critiques of the D-N view. One critique, and this
was known to Hempel, is that functional explanations do not ﬁt the D-N pattern nor the
probabilistic reﬁnements to it. Functional explanations, the third pattern in Nagel’s list, are
closely associated with questions in biology and studies of human affairs (Nagel, 1961).
Here the puzzlement concerns the purpose or function of something: Why do Os have P?
(Kitcher, 1989, p. 417). Examples of questions requiring a functional explanation include:
Why do deciduous trees have leaves that drop in the fall? Why do snakes have skins that
shed? and Why do humans have kidneys? In answering any of these questions, attention
must be paid to consequences, ends, functions, and purposes.
Consider an example discussed by Salmon (1989). We seek an explanation for why
jackrabbitslivinginhotclimateshavesuchlargeears.Thefunctionalexplanationisthatthe
ears serve as radiators of excess body heat. The problem for the D-N model in accounting
for this explanation is that there is no general law as required by that model that can be used
in a derivation of the fact that jackrabbits have large ears. The possible candidates, such as
that mammals living in hot regions have large ears, are simply not true generally.
An additional critique comes from historians who insist there is a narrative or genetic
explanationthatrelatesthestoryleadinguptotheeventtobeexplained.Scrivenchampioned
thiscritiqueandothersoftheD-Nmodelinaseriesofpapers(1959,1962,1963).Theclassic
example that Scriven used concerns the mayor who contracted paresis. In the example
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outthathepreviouslyhadsyphilisthatwasleftuntreated.TheproblemfortheD-Nmodelin
accounting for this explanation is that there is only a low probability of contracting paresis
from untreated syphilis. Therefore, there is no possibility of constructing the general law
requiredofthemodelandthelowprobabilityoftheconnectionbetweensyphilisandparesis
challengeseventheprobabilisticreﬁnementstothemodel,whichdependupontheexistence
of high probabilities.
Nagel considered the distinctiveness of genetic explanations debatable, because he
thought it likely they were “by and large probabilistic” (1961, p. 26). As he explained,
“the task of genetic explanations is to set out the sequence of major events through which
someearliersystemhasbeentransformedintoalaterone.Theexplanatorypremisesofsuch
explanations will therefore necessarily contain a large number of singular statements about
past events in the system under inquiry” (p. 25). He noted that because not every past event
is mentioned, those events that are included must be selected “on the basis of assumptions
(frequently tacit ones) as to what sorts of events are causally relevant to the development
of the system” (p. 25). Salmon (1989) also refers to genetic explanations and describes
them as narrative. Such explanations, he wrote, consist in “telling the story leading up to
the event to be explained. Since the mere recital of just any set of preceding occurrences
may have no explanatory value whatever, the narrative must involve events that are causally
relevant to the explanandum [what is being explained] if it is to serve as an explanation”
(p. 32).
A ﬁnal problem with the D-N model that we shall mention is that it does not respect
the asymmetry of the explanatory relation. If A explains B, then, unless we are dealing
with the special case of a feedback loop, B does not explain A. We can explain the length
of a shadow by the length of the ﬂagpole that casts it and the angle of the sun. However,
we cannot explain the length of the ﬂagpole by the length of the shadow and the angle of
the sun (although we could infer it). The D-N model cannot block this type of unwanted
explanation, primarily because it is based upon a constant conjunction view of causation.
However, as Kitcher (1989) has pointed out, the resolution to this problem depends upon
having an adequate view of causation, and causation is no more tractable an issue than
explanation.
A contemporary alternative to the D-N view designed to avoid such critiques, an al-
ternative with acknowledged debt to its D-N predecessor, is Kitcher’s (1989) explanatory
uniﬁcation view. According to this view, the value of explanations resides in their enabling
us to unify and to organize knowledge. Scientiﬁc knowledge is uniﬁed to the extent that
our explanations ﬁt the phenomena into a general worldview with few independent as-
sumptions. In contrast to the D-N view and other causal accounts of explanation, which
allow explanations to be assessed individually, the explanatory uniﬁcation view requires
that explanations be assessed against the “explanatory store” (Kitcher, 1989, pp. 436–437)
available at the time. Kitcher’s view ﬁnds much of its motivation in the work of Friedman
(1974)whomaintainedthatatheoryofexplanationsmusttellushowtheyyieldunderstand-
ing. Understanding increases, he claimed, as the number of facts we have to take as brute
is reduced. Scientiﬁc knowledge is thus uniﬁed to the extent that we can derive the largest
number of facts from the smallest number of assumptions. That is, the same assumptions
are used again and again to derive different facts (Kitcher, 1989, p. 434). In its focus on
derivation, this view, like its D-N predecessor, is deductive.
Another contemporary alternative responds to the pragmatic intuitions in Scriven’s cri-
tiques of the D-N view. So often in practice, Scriven showed, we are prepared to accept (his
wayo fsignaling the involvement of pragmatics) as explanations statements that have no
chance of being ﬁtted within a deductive argument. The most prominent champion of the
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ananswertoaquestion,speciﬁcallytoawhy-question.Inadditiontothepragmaticelement
introduced by viewing explanations as speech acts in this manner, van Fraassen developed
pragmatictheoriesofquestionsandofanswers.Histheoryofquestionsshowsthatquestions
must be interpreted in context, making their meanings pragmatic. He asks us to consider
the question, “Why Pk?” Pk states the fact to be explained, for example, “Birch trees lose
their leaves in the fall.” Central to van Fraassen’s view is that the question admits of many
interpretations depending upon the context. Two constraints are required to narrow the ﬁeld
ofpossibilities.First,weneedtoknowthecontrastclass,X.Ifthequestionmeans,(a)“Why
do birch trees (as opposed to other types) lose their leaves in the fall?, X ={ pine, spruce,
ﬁr, cedar,....}.I fthe question means, (b) “why do birch trees (similar to other types) lose
their leaves in the fall”, X ={ maple, oak, beech, ash, sycamore,...}. Alternatively, if X =
{spring, summer, winter}, then the question is being interpreted as asking why the loss of
leavesoccursinthefallasopposedtosomeotherseason.Othercontrastclassesarepossible.
The second constraint on interpretation comes from the relevance relation, R. What is the
relation between the fact to be explained, Pk, and the contrast class, X, that the answer to
the question, A, must provide? Under interpretation (b), the relevance relation might be that
all these trees fall into the class deciduous. Under interpretation (a), the relevance relation
might be causal: if deciduous trees did not lose their leaves when ground water was frozen,
they would lose much more water than coniferous trees and risk death. So, in answer to,
“Why Pk?”, van Fraassen supplies the answer: “Pk in contrast to (the rest of) X, because A”
(1980, p. 143).
Table 2 contains an overview of the functions and types of explanations discussed in this
section. As we have said, function and type are not always clearly separable. For example,
justiﬁcation sometimes appeals to causes; deductive-nomological explanation is meant to
be causal, although it adopts a view of causation at odds with those who advocate a more
mechanistic view; at least Kitcher’s meaning of the explanatory uniﬁcation view relies
upon deduction to provide the ideal form of explanation. The entries reveal the broad set of
meanings attached to the concept of explanation.
WHAT IS NARRATIVE EXPLANATION?
In1961Goudgeproposedthatwhenoneaimstomakeunique,nonrecurrentevolutionary
events intelligible, “recourse must be had to historical or ‘narrative’ explanations. The situ-
ation does not permit of being treated systematically in terms of general laws” (pp. 70–71).
This stand was disputed by those who held that all good scientiﬁc explanations necessarily
contain reference, at least implicitly, to at least one general law (e.g., Ruse, 1971, 1975;
Hull,1974).Deductive-nomologicalexplanationsstillheldgreatappealatthetime.Wehave
seen Scriven’s challenge to the D-N model is that frequently we explain particular events
or conditions, not by providing a deductive argument from general laws and other events
and conditions, but by simply pointing to other events and conditions. Speciﬁc events, as
we have seen, are the elemental core of narrative. Hempel (1965, pp. 359–364) tried to
accommodate Scriven’s objection within his D-N framework by dealing with pragmatic
aspects of the explanatory situation. His conclusion is telling: “An explanation may well be
put into the form of a sequential narrative, but it will explain only if it at least tacitly pre-
supposes certain nomic connections between the different stages cited” (p. 362). According
to Hempel, pointing to the mayor’s untreated syphilis does not explain his paresis unless
also we assume a causal lawlike connection between the two. This intuition of Hempel’s
is difﬁcult to deny and has bedeviled most attempts to improve upon his D-N model de-
spite its known ﬂaws, and complicates the development of a coherent notion of narrative
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TABLE 2 Explanations and Their Characteristics
Explanatory Function or Type Characteristics
Interpretive explanation • clariﬁes meaning
• deﬁnes terms, propositions, treatises
• assigns, develops, or expands meaning
Justiﬁcatory explanation • explains by justifying why something was done
• provides reasons for acting
• appeals to norms, standards, or values
• may appeal to causes as reasons for acting
Descriptive explanation • explains by describing a process or structure
Causal explanation • explains by citing a cause for events or laws
• events may include human actions
• many scientiﬁc explanations are causal
Deductive-nomological • explains particular facts or general laws by deriving
explanation the facts or laws from general laws and other facts
• must include at least one universal law
• basic structure is a deductive argument
• causation interpreted as Humean constant conjunction
Statistical explanation • explains facts by showing them to be highly probable
• basic structure is an inductive argument
• must include at least one statistically general law
• causation typically is not implied
Functional explanation • explains a fact by indicating its function
Explanatory uniﬁcation • explains phenomena by ﬁtting them into a general
worldview
• aims to derive largest number of facts from
smallest number of assumptions
• views ideal explanation as deductive
Pragmatic explanation • explains by answering why questions
• questions are asked and answers are given in a context
• contexts enable determination of appropriate contrast
classes and relevance relations
Narrative explanation • explains an event by narrating the events leading up to
its occurrence
• cites unique events as explanatory of other unique events
• posits some events as causes of others
• seeks uniﬁcation (but does not supply deductive
tightness) by showing how the event to be explained
is one of an intelligible series of events
• rarely supports predictions, but rather relies upon
retrodiction to indicate how the present is a
consequence of the past
If you can explain an event, according to the D-N view, then the explanation (including
knowledge of the initial conditions) would have allowed you to predict it. Turning to the
cannonball example once more, it can been seen that on the basis of the general laws and
the antecedent conditions that explain why the cannonball traveled 2000 ft, it could have
been predicted that the cannonball would travel 2000 ft before hitting the earth. However,
in some scientiﬁc ﬁelds it is not possible to assume such symmetry. As Roqu´ e (1988)
wrote, “Explanation was possible, according to modern science, because phenomena were
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historyofthesystem”(p.249).Sheaddsthatinclassicalnearequilibriumthermodynamics,
one can argue that structures exhibit time but no history: “unlike structures explicable
by means of classical thermodynamics, structures that are created under non-equilibrium
conditions.... are irreducibly historical structures in the sense that their future behavior
is not independent of their past.... [so] these not only exhibit time but also history....
Within each stable state, then, the deductive-nomological model works nicely; between
states...one is left with ex post facto narrative” (p. 250). Predictability, as we have seen,
is also not a feature of narrative. Rather, the norm is retrodiction, whereby what happens in
the present is understood as a consequence of what has come before.
In her examination of the differences between historical and experimental science,
Cleland (2002) states that “Hypotheses of prototypical historical science [among which
she lists paleontology, archaeology, geology, astronomy, biology, and astrophysics] differ
fromthoseofclassicalexperimentalscienceinsofarastheyareconcernedwithevent-tokens
instead of regularities among event-types.1 This helps to explain the narrative character of
many historical explanations. The complexity of the causal conditions and the length of the
causal chain (connecting the cause to its current traces) bury the regularities in a welter of
contingencies” (p. 480).
As mentioned earlier, the presence of contingent events is a narrative feature that adds
unpredictability and, thus, suspense to a text—that whets the narrative appetite. For sci-
ence, Goudge (1961) wrote: “The presence of many contingent, contributory conditions in
[a temporal] sequence makes it idle to hope that the statements constituting the explanatory
pattern can be organized deductively, or even, perhaps, axiomatically” (p. 74), although
one committed to the D-N view such as Hempel would certainly maintain that such or-
ganization must be possible, at least in principle, for there to be any explanation. Instead,
Goudge maintained that just as historians produce a coherent narrative of events in order
to make the sequence of events intelligible as a relatively independent whole, “In a similar
way the explanatory pattern we are considering forms a coherent or connected narrative
which represents a number of possible events in an intelligible sequence. Hence the pattern
is appropriately called a ‘narrative explanation”’ (p. 75). Similarly, Roqu´ e writes: “Nar-
rative is not a mere temporal listing of discrete events; that is mere chronology, a linear
sequence of atomistic, separate facts. In true narrative the telling of the tale explains by
interweaving sequential but overlapping threads such that a temporal pattern, the meaning
that has ﬂowed throughout the unique sequence of events and has bound them into a whole,
emerges” (p. 251).
Inallthesestatements,itisimportanttonotetheviewthatnarrativeisimportantwhenone
needs to explain unique events, “unique and unrepeatable events—not recurring events” as
Moffett (1983) stated. He seemed to assume, however, that none of science is characterized
by attention to unique and unrepeatable events. This assumption is in error. Morson (1994)
uses the writings of Stephen Jay Gould in his discussion of narrative in science, asserting,
“Laws of motion allow us to retrodict and to predict with equal certainty...But that is
not true of evolution...For Gould, evolution is truly a historical science in the sense that
contingency, unrepeatable facts and unpredictable details play an important part” (p. 245).
“Why did Bighorn sheep evolve in the North American Rocky Mountains?” seems to be a
question calling for a narrative account. The event is a result of an innumerable sequence of
1 Generally,thetype-tokendistinctionisbetweenacategoryandamemberofthatcategory:betweendog
and Spot, the dog next door. The distinction can be generalized to events—between people saying “hello”
topeopleandPresidentGeorgeW.Bushsaying“hello”toPrimeMinisterSilvioBerlusconiontheoccasion
of President Bush’s visit to Italy in July 2003—and to linguistic expressions—between the word next and
the particular use of that word found in the previous sentence. Now that we have made this distinction, it
can be seen that the events that make up narratives are event-tokens.552 NORRIS ET AL.
historical events, some of the more important of which could be listed. The emergence of
Bighorn sheep could hardly have been predicted, though, even if the relevant facts leading
to their evolution could have been isolated in advance.
Goudge, Cleland, and Roqu´ e also assume that there are areas of science concerned
with explaining the unique and particular. Therefore, one might surmise that narrative
explanations or explanatory stories do have a place in science, albeit one limited to ﬁelds
whereitisnecessarytodetailasetofunique,contingentlyandcausallylinkedeventsinorder
tomakeaparticulareventorphenomenonclear,understandable,orintelligible.So,weneed
a distinction between scientiﬁc ﬁelds in which particular events are intrinsic to the science,
versus those in which they are not. We do not aim to supply a complete categorization here,
but return yet again to the cannonball example. Explaining what happened to a particular
cannonball is not intrinsic to the project of physics. Rather, it is an application of general
physical laws to a particular context. That particular itself is uninteresting to physicists as
physicists, because, having explained any particular they have put in place an explanation
for any other token of the type. There is no new physics involved in the application of
general laws.
By way of contrast, consider ﬁelds in which the particular has intrinsic interest. In those
ﬁelds, questions such as the following are germane to the discipline and answering them
marks an advance in the science: How was the Earth’s moon formed? Is there life on Mars,
and,ifso,fromwherediditcome?WhydidtheNeanderthalswholivedinwhatisnowSpain
become extinct? How were the Italian dolomites formed? How did the dinosaurs whose
fossilized remains are now found in Alberta meet their deaths? If narrative explanations
are demanded ever in science, it is questions such as these that seem to come closest to
demanding them. The question remains whether narrative explanations are provided in
response.
Narrative explanations naturally must take on features both of narratives and of explana-
tions. From what we have seen, the narrative elements of event-tokens and past time seem
to be central. From the explanation side, it seems that narrative explanations are causal,
but not deductive-nomological. Whether they are D-N in principle is an issue we believe is
unresolved, but in practice they clearly are not deductive arguments. The other feature that
seems prominent in narrative explanation is their unifying power. In this regard, they seem
related to Kitcher’s explanatory uniﬁcation model. The ﬁnal entry in Table 2 summarizes
these characteristics of narrative explanations.
THE SCIENTIFIC STANDING OF THE NARRATIVE EFFECT
Many proposals for the use of narrative in science education rest on the presumption
of a narrative effect. Such an effect is desirable educationally, in that it means improved
memory for content, enhanced interest in learning, and greater comprehension of what
is learned. The theoretical model outlined in this paper presupposes no such effect, but
neither does it rule it out. Clearly, however, the status of the narrative effect is important
to our agenda, and, as it happens, we believe the empirical evidence provides moderate
support for a claim that there is such a thing as a narrative effect in a very broad and
general sense. For example, there is research showing that narrative passages are read
faster, comprehended better, and tend to be more absorbing than expository passages and
perhaps than other genres as well (Graesser, 1981). Other research has suggested that a
good narrative can increase the plausibility and persuasiveness of information presented
(Voss, Wiley, & Sandak, 1999), a ﬁnding that would be important for science education,
which places considerable emphasis on information. It has also been found that narrative
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apply themselves more when reading narrative compared to expository prose (Zabrucky &
Moore, 1999).
An explanation sometimes offered for such ﬁndings is that the actions and events in
narrative are interpreted by readers as more concrete and more easily and closely organized
by causal relationships than the organizational structures found in expository and argu-
mentative prose. Of course, not all narratives show these effects over all expository and
argumentative texts in all contexts. Many factors seem to be at work, including the fact that
many texts are not purely one or the other type. For example, a narrative may have elements
of description, an argument may contain a narrative, and so on.
Expository and argumentative texts tend to be more difﬁcult than narrative texts for
several reasons. Expository texts tend to have greater vocabulary load and propositional
density. There tends to be less familiarity with the wide variety of possible expository and
argumentative structures than with narrative structures. However, some of these factors are
not necessarily tied to genre. For example, there exist both easy expository pieces with
very few unfamiliar words and few propositions and very difﬁcult narratives with many
unfamiliar words and high propositional density. In such a comparison, the expository
piece would likely be comprehended and recalled more easily. Also, there is the argument
that positive narrative effects are not due to narrative itself, but to the fact that narrative is
the genre that is used primarily for teaching reading and that school students are seldom
taught how to interpret other genres (Graesser, Golding, & Long, 1991).
In order to establish conﬁdently a narrative effect, we would need experiments that vary
just the texts, comparing pure narrative and pure expository with the same content and difﬁ-
culty while keeping all other text variables as well as reader, activity, and context variables
controlled. Aside from the fact that such an experiment would be virtually impossible to
implement,theﬁndingofanarrativeeffectinthiscontrolledsituationcouldnotbeexpected
to hold in uncontrolled contexts where all the other text, reader, activity and context vari-
ables would immediately come into play. Any of these variables could override the genre
variable so that the effect is no longer observed. Thus, a single genre variable is unlikely to
account for the ease or difﬁculty of any particular piece of prose in educational contexts.
This being said, it is a ubiquitous observation that students ﬁnd expository texts (e.g.,
content area textbooks) more difﬁcult to read with comprehension than narrative texts, and
reasons for this phenomenon have been noted by a number of people over the years. For
example,S´ aenzandFuchs(2002)outlinefactorsthatcontributetodifﬁcultywithexpository
reading:
Empirical evidence indicates that for most students, expository reading poses a greater
challenge than does narrative reading...For secondary students, the effects of expository
readingarewideandvarying...Althoughmanyfactorsmaycontributetothedifﬁcultystu-
dents experience with expository reading, the four most commonly cited are text structure,
conceptualdensityandfamiliarity,vocabularyknowledge,andpriorknowledge.(pp.31–33)
Arguments such as these are fairly commonplace. For example, Alvermann and Boothby
(1982) remarked:
Educators commonly believe that upper elementary students ﬁnd expository material (e.g.,
content area texts) more difﬁcult to comprehend than narrative, story-like material. Empiri-
cal studies...generally have supported this belief. Teachers’ explanations of why children
ﬁnd content area materials more difﬁcult have pointed to such factors as students’ lack of
experience in dealing with expository structure, their unfamiliarity with the vocabulary or
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Because many such statements and summaries are found in the literature, and because
thereisnostrongbodyofopposingarguments,itseemsfairlywellacceptedthat,ingeneral,
expository texts are more difﬁcult to read than narrative texts.
Somehavearguedthatnarrativehasaprivilegedstatusinthecognitivesystemforavariety
of reasons (Graesser, Golding, & Long, 1991; Graesser, Olde, & Klettke, 2002; Herman,
2003). Some of these arguments seem quite persuasive. There is appeal to the view that
narratives are easier to comprehend, because the most basic elements of narratives are
germane aspects of all human experience. We are all agents with purposes of some sort
whose lives inevitably consist of a series of events situated in time. This being the case, and
thesebeingthefundamentalpropertiesofnarratives,itisnotalargeleaptothenotionthatthe
“narrative” experience of our lives would make narratives in general easier to comprehend
or recall than the content of some expository texts, which may be much less related to life
experience.
Despite such claims for a narrative effect, there actually has not been much research
donethatdirectlycomparesnarrativetoothertexttypes.Wehaveonﬁlealmost200articles
related to the study of narrative. Of these, 45 are experiments. Of the experiments, 26
included both narrative and expository texts as independent variables. Any one of these
studies is, in itself, rather inconsequential. However, 13 of the experiments provided clear
evidence to support the narrative effect, and 7 experiments provided evidence that was not
so clear but was supportive. In 3 experiments, expository texts were found to have the
advantage, once notably. In the notable study favoring expository text, the same passages
were used as one of Graesser’s much cited studies in favor of narratives. We interpret
this level of evidence supporting a narrative effect as moderate. It suggests to us that
frequently other essential variables in the reading process had a stronger effect than the text
variable of genre. We are thinking of reader variables such as prior knowledge, interest,
motivation,purposeforreading,readingproﬁciency,andstrategyuse,andactivityvariables
suchasdiscussion,summarization,multiple-choicequestions,andcuedrecall.Thefactthat
a narrative effect has not been produced more than 50% of the time in controlled conditions
leads us to expect an even lower likelihood of the effect in the uncontrolled conditions of
school science teaching.
TWO POSSIBLE EXAMPLES OF NARRATIVE EXPLANATION
We now are ready to use the narrative elements detailed in Table 1 and the descriptors of
narrative explanation in Table 2 to test the narrative credentials of two examples of prose.
The prominence of Millar’s and Osborne’s (1998) document in the United Kingdom and
beyondwarrantsourattentiontoit.Theyputforwardtwoexamplesasexplanatorystoriesto
illustratethisformofsciencewriting,oneabouttheEarthanditsplaceinthesolarsystemand
the other about the particle model of matter. From their discussion, it seems clear that they
are thinking about explanations intrinsic to science. We will examine The Particle Model of
Chemical Reactions.W etake the second example from a lengthy passage in a science trade
book (Ward, 1997). The book is subtitled, Why the Ice Age Mammals Disappeared, and
providesanextendedaccountover10chaptersofthatexplanation.Wardemploysamixture
of genres, sometimes presenting an argument from evidence for a scientiﬁc conclusion,
sometimes providing an expository account of natural phenomena occurring during the late
Mesozoic period, and at other times launching into extended ﬁctional narratives.
The Particle Model
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Imagine being able to ‘peek inside’ matter. Then you would ‘see’ that matter is made of
tiny particles of less than 100 different types. These particles, called atoms, move about,
arranging or re-arranging themselves in patterns or sticking together to make new, more
complex particles. Alternatively, complex particles can be broken up into their constituent
atoms.
Seen at this level, breaking a brick tears particles apart from each other, as links between
the particles are broken. Water evaporating is a few particles breaking free of the large
collection in the puddle to move freely in the air above. Salt dissolving is charged particles
breaking free from the surface of the crystal of salt, dispersing themselves amongst the
particles of water. Iron rusting is particles from the air (oxygen, water) bumping into the
particles of iron and combining to make a new bigger particle. Polythene is made when
particles of ethene, whizzing freely around, join up in long chains when they bump into
one another. Big complex particles (enzymes) act on others by being the right shape to
help other particles come together and combine. Some of the particles are made of a single
nucleus surrounded by electrons. If you looked around, you would ﬁnd only 92 stable
kinds, differing from each other by the positive charge on the nucleus (from 1 to 92) and
their weight. Helium particles, for instance, would be four times as heavy as those of
hydrogen. Each particle would be surrounded by an equal number of negative electrons so
that any atom is electrically neutral. The electrons are arranged in a characteristic pattern,
and the pattern repeats itself so that certain atoms have similar behaviour and fall into
natural families. This pattern also decides which kinds of atoms any atom would readily
stick to.
When atoms join together in clusters they are called molecules. When atoms combine,
the electron arrangement changes giving the new molecule totally different properties.
So sodium (a highly reactive metal) can combine with chlorine (a highly reactive and
poisonousgas)tomakesodiumchloride(commonsaltwhichweeat).Thisishowatomsand
molecules make the huge number of different materials that there are—the many ‘chemical
compounds’. So when atoms break apart and regroup, a ‘chemical change’ has occurred
and the new substance is different from its constituent parts. (Millar & Osborne, 1998,
pp. 2014–2015).
This piece of writing is explanatory in two senses of the term: it is an effort to make what
is obscure to students intelligible to them; and it provides an elementary causal account
of a number of phenomena, including evaporation, dissolution, rusting, and the formation
of common compounds. In this latter role, the explanation is intrinsic to science. But is
it narrative? We ﬁrst see that the question seeking an explanation, “What is the particle
model of chemical reactions?”, does not contain the focus on particularity and uniqueness
of events associated with narrative in our model. We also note that the text does not name a
single event-token. It does contain descriptions of conditional events and events with other
modalqualiﬁers:“Thenyouwouldsee...”;“Ifyoulookedaround...”;“Sosodium...can
combine with chlorine....” It does name event-types: “...breaking a brick tears particles
apart from each other...”; “Salt dissolving is charged particles breaking free from the
surface of the crystal of salt.”
The passage does have a narrator. The narrator is unknown and impersonal, but there is
someoneaskingustoimaginethingsandsuggestingwhatwemightseeifwedid.However,
the narrator is quite peripheral to the passage and does not play the role of manipulating the
order of events that can be so crucial to narration.
What about narrative appetite? Rather than open and nonlinear, the text is closed and
linear. The narrator does not create points of ambiguity in the text in order to invite the
reader to see multiple possible futures and to provoke the reader into a state of curiosity,
suspense, and tenseness. Largely, this is because the text does not invite wonderment about556 NORRIS ET AL.
what happens next. There is no before and after in this text, because time, another narrative
element, is absent. What is being described is timeless.
Is there a narrative structure? Is there agency and purpose? Narrative structure is not
present largely because there is no plot time to manipulate in the narrating. There is no
beginning, middle, ending; no complications and resolutions; no imbalances, successes,
or failures. There are no agents in this passage; nobody who is causing and experiencing
events. There is nobody to be responsible for anything. Clearly, the text is designed for the
purpose of helping the reader understand the natural world. However, the text is not about
how human beings relate to that world.
Finally, how is the reader likely to interpret this text? We cannot tell with certainty from
our model, which is theoretical. However, due to the lack of most narrative elements, and
given the tenuousness of the narrative effect even in experimental studies, we predict that
it would not be interpreted as a narrative or as narrative explanation. More likely, it would
be interpreted as descriptive prose, offering an exposition of why certain event-types occur,
and,consequently,wouldbeunlikelytohavethepositiveeffectsonmemory,interpretation,
and comprehension attributed to narratives. Of course, these predictions depend for their
success on our theoretical model having picked out the elements crucial to readers for
identifying narrative.
The Ice Age Mammals
The excerpts below are from a four-page section that provides a ﬁctional account on the
demise of the dinosaurs by focusing on the area of the Earth that is now Texas.
The herd of duckbills lowed to one another as the ﬁrst hints of dawn began to paint the
eastern sky with the faint promise of daybreak. The low coastal swampland was already
alive with the calls of birds, but calls somehow dissonant and anxious, as if predators were
approaching, though none could be seen or smelled. To the west, still black with night,
the full moon was beginning to set; to the south, however, a bright star blazed forth, with
a long phosphorescent tail extending across half the night sky. It had been in the sky for
manynights,growinglargerandbrighterwitheachreappearance.Amongthevertebrateand
invertebrate ﬂiers that depended on the moon for navigation, this new beacon scrambled all
the visual neurons; nowhere in the intricately coded DNA of the birds, insects, pterosaurs,
and pterodactyls was there any information about a second moon in the sky; it troubled
them at a deep, intracellular level. Seaward, in the warm reefal ocean, the combination of
approaching day, a full moon, and the new celestial light meant extra food for the piscine
swimmers and shelled ammonite predators as they hunted crabs and shrimp in the coralline
cities.
The dinosaur herd was completely awake now and starting to feed on the rich low
vegetation.... The bright head of the comet could be seen to descend slowly into the south
and ﬁnally disappear below the horizon, to be followed some seconds later by the orange
glow of a second dawn.
From the southern horizon a thin but brilliant bar of white light shot upward into the
sky, the ﬁrst proclamation of the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. Molten
rock from the impact created this beam of light as rock from the comet and the impact site
were intermixed and blasted into the thin pillar of vacuum created by the comet’s fall to
earth. The dinosaur herd was still oblivious; southern lightshows were irrelevant to brains
programmed to seek food, avoid predators, and propagate. But the great ﬂocks of birds paid
heed, falling silent as the second dawn unfolded. The thin pencil of light began to change
color,becomemorediffuse,andwiden;fromitsbase,tinyspecksoflightfannedoutwardin
all directions. What sounded like distant thunder now silenced the dinosaurs as well, and all
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towardtheherd.Thedinosaursturnedinfearastheshockwaveapproachedandthenpassed
in speeding seismic fury, emptying the trees of birds, creating great ﬂocks of screaming
avian and reptilian ﬂyers in the rapidly brightening sky. The now-terriﬁed dinosaurs rushed
in all directions, oblivious to the silence that once more ﬁlled the landscape, oblivious as
well to the orange cloud creeping upward from the southern horizon....
Swampsandlakesandespeciallythesea’sedgebecamelastrefugesofthegreatMesozoic
fauna. The survivors crowded the shorelines of the once and future seaway beneath the
cosmic barrage, explosions now blasting great clots of burning forest as the meteors rained
inward. And through that inferno a new noise manifested itself, a great roar coming from
out to sea as a huge new mountain range appeared in the direction of the retreating ocean,
a mountain range growing larger every moment, a black mountain reﬂecting the angry red
of the burning land, a mountain now a kilometer high, a mountain formed from the angry
sea, the largest wave in the history of the world....I nT e xas nothing survived. Nothing.
(Ward, 1997, pp. 63–66)
This passage very closely matches the set of narrative elements in Table 1. First, it names
event after event. They are event-tokens and they happened in the past. There is a narrator
standing outside of the events and relating them to the reader in a sequence that roughly
matchesthesequenceofplotevents.Wheretherearesimultaneousevents,thenarratorchose
which to relate ﬁrst, allowing the reader to compare, for example, the initial obliviousness
of the dinosaurs with the initial alertness of the ﬂocks of birds. Narrative appetite is whetted
in part by the pace and order of the narration. For example, in a section not quoted, the
narrator takes considerable time to describe what was occurring as the sea receded, which
enhancesanticipationaboutwhatthiseventforeshadowed.Butnarrativeappetiteiswhetted
even earlier in the description of the bird calls as “somehow dissonant and anxious.” “Why
so?” the reader is prompted to ask. There is also consciousness that, although it does not
rise to the level of agency, frequently reﬂects the responses of humans in similar terrifying
situations:theinitialobliviousnessofthedinosaurs,thepayingheedandfallingsilentofthe
ﬂocksofbirds,thedinosaursturningtofacethesouthinfearandtheninterror,thecreatures
capableofswimmingseekingrefugeinthesea,thelandcreaturesﬂeeingtheblazingforest,
and so on. Regarding purpose, it is difﬁcult to read this passage without imagining what
it must have been like to be there. Perhaps this was one of the author’s purposes, to help
human beings better understand the natural world, to realize that when animals face such
cataclysmic events they experience similar sensations to humans.
In addition, the text is explanatory. It ﬁts most closely with the models of genetic and
historicalexplanationdiscussedpreviously.Thestorysetsoutasequenceofevents“through
which some earlier system has been transformed into a later one” (Nagel, 1961, p. 25) and
tells “the story leading up to the event to be explained” (Salmon, 1989, p. 32). The event
being explained, the extinction of the dinosaurs, also ﬁts into the set of “unique, non-
recurrent evolutionary events” mentioned by Goudge (1961, pp. 70–71) as calling for
historical or narrative explanations and ﬁts with Cleland’s (2002) idea that “the hypotheses
of prototypical historical science...are concerned with event-tokens” (p. 480).
This example contains many of the narrative elements we have described in our model.
Also, the explanation is intrinsic to science. As such, it suggests that it is possible to
constructnarrativeexplanationsthatarepartofthesubstantivecontentofscienceitself,and
not merely explanations about science. Under the sorts of carefully controlled experimental
situations where a narrative effect has been found, we predict that readers would interpret
this passage as narrative and use that schema to form expectations and anticipations for the
text. We also predict that under such conditions the passage would have the positive effects
on memory, interest, and comprehension frequently associated with narrative. However, as
noted earlier, these predictions from our model must be subjected to empirical test.558 NORRIS ET AL.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Ourinvestigationwaspromptedbyclaimsaboutnarrativeproseanditsexpectedpositive
roleinscienceeducation.Aswehaveshown,theexpectationshaveatleastsomeplausibility.
Although some evidence tends to support the use of narrative in science education, more
needs to be considered. The research comparing narrative to other genres suffers from
design problems due to failure to control relevant variables. It is very difﬁcult, for example,
to construct comparable narrative and expository passages that are alike in all respects
exceptthattheyareindifferentgenres.Thegenresinvitedifferenttopics,wordchoices,and
sentence structures and it might be these, and not the genres themselves, that are leading to
differences in readers’ responses. In addition, other studies (e.g., Phillips, 2002) conclude
that although narrative appears easier than expository text for students to comprehend, the
difference is small. Even more to the point, Phillips found that the inferential interpretation
ability of students is weak no matter what the genre. Therefore, once we venture past
rote learning, literal interpretation of texts, and locating information, students will require
additional literacy competence and the instruction that fosters it no matter what the genre.
Having said all of this, we believe the role of narrative in science education needs to
be explored more completely. We started this exploration with a focus on narrative expla-
nations intrinsic to science. We provided a detailed theoretical analysis of narrative prose,
indicating its hypothesized crucial elements. If the narrative effect hypothesis has any sub-
stance, then it might be the presence of some or all of these elements that produces the
effects on memory, comprehension, and interpretation that we all desire. However, scien-
tiﬁc explanations typically are not characterized by event-tokens, past time, and agency,
the elements we have posited as being of primary importance in narrative text. We have
shownthatnarrativeexplanationsarepossibleinscience,butthattheyarelikelytobefound
in particular contexts, namely, those involving the explanation of unique and nonrecurring
events. Since scientiﬁc work is often concerned with general and recurring events, narrative
isunlikelytobefoundfrequentlyortobeappropriatetothetask.Wehavethereforebeguna
search for examples of narrative explanations in areas of science that are most likely to deal
with unique events, one of which we have reported. We know from this example that it is
possible to create an elaborate narrative explanation that is intrinsic to one area of science.
Additionally, we predicted that this text would demonstrate the narrative effects sought.
In order to make narrative explanations a signiﬁcant part of the science curriculum,
a number of things would have to happen. First, a more extensive catalogue of narrative
explanationsisneededinordertoprovideabasisforcurriculum.Second,ifmorethanavery
fewnarrativeexplanationsaretobeincludedinthecurriculum,thentopicsthattraditionally
have been a minor part of the curriculum will have to be given a more prominent place.
There would be more emphasis on the historical, so-called “softer,” sciences, less emphasis
on what is general and universal, and more emphasis on particulars that are of scientiﬁc
interest.
We have been concerned speciﬁcally with the nature and use of narrative explanations
but there may well be reasons to use narratives in science education that have little to do
with scientiﬁc explanation. As we noted at the very beginning of this paper, narratives may
be used to introduce content and inspire interest in scientiﬁc investigation, which would
lead to more involvement with scientiﬁc texts. The potential many and various roles of
narrative in science education need to be further explicated and better understood. The
science education community must take these matters seriously, because alterations in the
science curriculum to include more narrative could have effects other than the positive ones
onmemory,comprehension,andinterestcontemplated.Onepossibleadditionaleffectmight
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behalf of females (OECD, 2000). We remain skeptical of this result, however, both because
itisnotclearthatitisthegenreofthetextthatdetersfemalesfromenteringscience(orsome
sciences) as frequently as they might, and it is not certain that females are more attracted
to narration than they might be to exposition and argumentation. An alternative possible
effect might be the attraction of greater numbers of individuals into science, both males
and females. This might occur as a result of less emphasis on more basic sciences, such as
physicsandchemistrywhichtendtobeuniversalintheirtheoriesandlaws,andmoreonthe
historicalsciences.Likenarrative,ifthisistrueofnarrative,thehistoricalsciencesmightbe
easier for most individuals to remember, interpret, and comprehend. More narration might
gosomewaytowardalteringtheimageofscienceasimpersonal,atemporal,andahistorical,
which characteristics appear off-putting at least for some people.
Atthispoint,wewishtoaddsomenotesofcautionandalsotosuggestapartialagendafor
future research. We must be wary of any proposal that appears to make a direct connection
between theory and practice or research and practice. Imagine a line of reasoning that
goes like this: Research indicates that narratives are easier to comprehend and recall and
more engaging than expository pieces in general. Therefore, if we put scientiﬁc material
into narrative form, this practice will facilitate comprehension of and engagement with
scientiﬁc content.
One problem with this line of reasoning is the apparent assumption of a direct and
transparent relationship between basic research and educational practice. This assumption
is almost never warranted (Norris, 2000). Regarding the use of narrative explanations in
science,thereareanumberofconcerns.First,thetwoexampleswehaveconsideredsuggest
that attempts to construct narrative explanations in science would result in hybrids that
contain some elements of narrative. Very little is known about the use of such hybrid texts
in learning. Because these are not true narratives, it is possible that much of the beneﬁt
associated with narratives would not materialize. True narratives, for example, tend to
evoke aesthetic and affective responses, which presumably aid comprehension and recall
in ways that are not well understood. Would hybrids do this? If they do not, it is unlikely
that the use of narrative explanations would yield the desired beneﬁts.
A second problem has to do with limiting students’ exposure to the types of text they
will encounter in real life and in specialized ﬁelds of study. Existing research indicates that
exposure to text types leads to knowledge of genre and enhances ability to comprehend
and learn from various forms of writing (Dymock, 1999). There is additional evidence that
narrative forms already dominate school reading experiences (Venezky, 2000). If narrative
is easier to comprehend and remember, and most of students’ reading instruction utilizes
narratives, how will they learn to cope with expository and argumentative text types? By
a twist of reasoning, any evidence for a narrative effect or the prominence of narrative in
life or school experience provides a powerful argument for providing more experience with
and instruction in expository and argumentative text, because these are the types of text that
students will have experienced the least and with which they will ﬁnd the most difﬁculty.
Undertheseconsiderations,more,notless,experienceandinstructionwithsuchtextsseems
justiﬁed.
Withtheseconcernsinmind,weclosewithafewsuggestedquestionsforfutureresearch,
and with a comment.
1. What are the implications of any narrative effect for teaching science? We need to
better understand and more closely explicate the issues surrounding this question in
order to grasp the possible roles of narrative in science education.
2. What features of narrative prove through empirical research to be most crucial, and
how do they operate? The answers to these questions are needed in order to learn560 NORRIS ET AL.
whethertheremightbepositivenarrativeeffectsfromtextsthathaveonlysomeofthe
features of pure narrative. Are there degrees of narrativity associated with degrees of
narrative effectiveness? We suggest that our list of narrative elements can help guide
empirical research into this question.
3. In addition to the possibly beneﬁcial effects of using narrative explanations intrinsic
toscience,aretherepositiveeffectsthataccruefromtheuseofnarrativeexplanations
extrinsic to science as has been suggested going back many decades?
Our comment: After extensive searching, we remain skeptical of ﬁnding much narrative
in primary scientiﬁc sources, even when those sources are in the historical sciences. Our
conjecture is that the narrative genre is not sufﬁciently attuned to the requirement that sci-
entiﬁc writing be cautious, circumspect, and tentative. We have found these characteristics
to be as prominent in the examples of historical science that we have examined as they are
in the more basic sciences. It is clear that genres other than narrative are predominant in
science and this prevalence perhaps should be reﬂected in science curriculum. Exposition
and argumentation are adopted for good reason in science—they not only effectively carry
the reasoning that connects scientiﬁc methods and data to conclusions; they also carry the
precision of description demanded for replication, test, and critique; and they carry the dis-
position of tentativeness and the policy of circumspection required by all honest scientiﬁc
work. Concomitantly, the role of narrative in scientiﬁc explanation is limited whenever sci-
ence aims for generality and is not interested in the particular, which is frequent. Therefore,
however important a role the use of narrative might play in science education, students
must still be taught to interpret and critique exposition and argumentation. There is greater
need for improvement in teaching students how to read well these genres than there is for
including more narration.
We thank Jonathan Osborne and three excellent reviewers for useful feedback on a previous version.
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